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Sammendrag 
Unilateral klimapolitikk kan lede til karbonlekkasje ved at utslippsintensiv og konkurranseutsatt 
industri flyttes til land med mindre streng regulering. Både analytiske og numeriske studier indikerer 
at karbonlekkasje kan dempes ved å kombinere en pris på utslipp med en karbontoll. Litteraturen 
indikerer også at karbontoll er mer kostnadseffektivt enn alternative virkemidler som produksjons-
basert refusjon av utslippsskatten eller gratis tildelte utslippskvoter.  
 
Foreløpig har ingen land innført karbontoll, men ulike varianter av produksjonsbasert refusjon og 
utslippskvoter har blitt implementert. EU sitt kvotesystem er et godt eksempel på produksjonsbaserte 
gratiskvoter. Produksjonsbasert refusjon eller gratiskvoter utgjør en indirekte subsidie av 
produksjonen. 
 
I denne artikkelen studerer vi en kombinasjon av produksjonsbasert refusjon (eller gratiskvoter) og en 
skatt på konsum av det samme godet. Vi viser at en slik kombinasjon kan ha samme virkning som en 
karbontoll. Videre viser vi at en slik ordning gir økt velferd, både for landet selv og for verden som 
helhet.  
 
Vi konkluderer derfor med at kombinasjonen produksjonsbasert refusjon og skatt på konsum kan være 
et fornuftig virkemiddel for å dempe karbonlekkasje ved unilateral klimapolitikk. Sammenliknet med 
refusjon alene gir denne kombinasjonen økt kostnadseffektivitet og velferd. Sammenliknet med en 
karbontoll medfører kombinasjonen mindre risiko for potensiell uenighet med handelspartnere som 
kan oppfatte innføring av karbontoll som proteksjonisme. 
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1. Introduction 
In response to the threat of climate change, many countries consider or have introduced unilateral 
climate policies. However, greenhouse gases are global pollutants and unilateral action leads to carbon 
leakage, such as relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) activities to countries with 
no or more lenient climate regulations. Unilateral constraints on emissions raise production costs for 
emission-intensive industries such as steel, cement, and chemical products, reducing their 
competitiveness in the world market, thereby inducing more production and emissions in unregulated 
regions. 
 
To mitigate counterproductive leakage, countries have either exempted EITE industries from the 
regulation, or searched for supplemental anti-leakage measures. As a prime example, EITE industries 
in the EU, which are regulated under an emissions trading system (EU ETS), have received large 
amounts of free allowances. Currently, allowances are mainly allocated in proportion to installations’  
production. Free allowances have also been introduced in other emissions trading systems such as in 
New Zealand, South Korea and California, and in the regional emissions trading systems in China 
(World Bank, 2014). Free allowance allocation conditional on output can be interpreted as output-
based rebating (OBR) of emission tax payments (e.g., Böhringer et al., 1998; Bernard et al., 2007). 
 
Another potential anti-leakage measure that figures prominently in the economic literature is border 
carbon adjustment (BCA) with carbon tariffs on imports and rebates on exports of EITE goods. Most 
studies on carbon leakage suggest that BCA outperform OBR with respect to leakage reduction and 
cost-effectiveness of reducing global emissions (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a; Fischer and Fox, 2012; 
Böhringer et al., 2014a). BCA are however politically contentious, and experts differ in their views 
about whether or not it is compatible with WTO rules (see e.g. Horn and Mavroidis, 2011, Tamiotti, 
2011, and Böhringer et al., 2012b).1 One signal for its limited political feasibility is that – so far – 
border measures have only been proposed but not implemented.2 
                                                     
1 In 2010, the Indian Environment Minister threatened to “bring a WTO challenge against any ‘carbon taxes’ that rich 
countries impose on Indian imports” (ICTSD, 2010). There is also a fear that BCA could trigger a trade war (Holmes et al., 
2011). On the other hand, Nordhaus (2015) argues that trade penalties can induce countries to join a “Climate Club” (see also 
Helm and Schmidt, 2015, and Böhringer et al., 2015). 
2 For example, border measures have been included in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 that passed the 
U.S. Congress but not the Senate (see https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2454; Fischer and Fox, 2011). 
Border measures have also been put forward by the EU Commission (2009) as a possible future alternative to free allowance 
allocation.  
5 
Regarding economic incentives, a key difference between OBR and BCA is that whereas the latter 
dampens foreign supply of EITE goods to the regulated country, the former stimulates domestic 
production. The reason is that OBR acts as an implicit production subsidy (Böhringer and Lange, 
2005). As a consequence, production and consumption of EITE goods will be too high under OBR, 
compared to second-best setting with BCA.3 In other words, the incentives to switch from buying 
emission-intensive to less emission-intensive products are weakened under OBR. As demonstrated by 
Böhringer et al. (2014a), whereas BCA automatically becomes inactive as the coalition of regulating 
countries covers the whole world, OBR continues to stimulate too much output of the EITE goods. 
Similarly, whereas BCA for goods without trade exposure has little or no impacts, OBR triggers too 
much production.  
 
In this paper we show that it is welfare improving for a country, that has already implemented a 
carbon tax (or an emissions trading system) along with OBR to EITE goods, to also impose a 
consumption tax on the same EITE goods. By consumption tax, we refer to product-specific taxes on 
all purchases of these goods, i.e., not only on final consumption but also on intermediate use in 
production. The intuition behind the welfare-improving effect of such a consumption tax is that OBR 
stimulates too much output of EITE goods. Note that in a closed economy OBR and the consumption 
tax cancel each other out, just as BCA become inactive in a closed economy. We also find that even in 
the case without any rebating, it is welfare improving to implement a consumption tax on EITE goods 
as it reduces foreign production (and hence emissions) of such goods.  
 
The theoretical trade literature has established the result “that a combination of a production subsidy 
and a consumption tax at equal rates is tantamount to a tariff if the commodity is being imported, and 
an export subsidy if it is being exported” (Dixit 1985, p.356). Building on this fundamental idea we 
show that combining OBR with a consumption tax may be equivalent with BCA. The equivalence 
requires that the consumption tax for an EITE good is equal to the OBR rate, which in turn must equal 
the carbon tariff and the export rebate.4 To our best knowledge, this equivalence result has not been 
shown so far in the context of emission leakage.5 
                                                     
3 This conclusion may no longer hold in the case of pre-existing market imperfections such as market power, see e.g. 
Gersbach and Requate (2004). 
4 All instruments are applied in monetary value per unit of the EITE good. For instance, with 100% rebating, i.e., all emission 
payments from an EITE industry are rebated back to the industry in proportion to firms’ output, the equivalence requires that 
the carbon tariff is based on domestic emission intensities, and that there is 100% export rebating.  
5 In a somewhat similar context with trade in a homogenous fossil fuel good, Hoel (1994) notes that a climate coalition can 
improve its terms-of-trade in the fuel market by either introducing an import (export) tariff or a combination of production 
subsidy (tax) and consumption tax (subsidy) if the coalition is a net importer (exporter) of fossil fuels. 
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For unilateral climate policy design, our finding suggests a viable alternative to contentious BCA, 
thereby lowering the risk of potentially detrimental trade wars. From a practical point of view, there 
are no extra administrative costs in determining the consumption taxes as long as benchmarks are 
already determined for the OBR rates (such as the benchmarks currently used in the EU ETS).  
 
We substantiate our analytical findings with complementary numerical results based on a stylized 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with two regions and four goods, where the goods can 
be either consumed or used as intermediate input into production. The numerical results are in 
accordance with our analytical findings. In addition, the simulations demonstrate that the advantage of 
a consumption tax becomes particularly relevant if the EITE good produced domestically cannot be 
easily substituted by foreign goods. In this case the potential for leakage is limited, and thus the 
distortive effects of stimulating output are getting more critical. By combining OBR with a 
consumption tax, the distortive effect of OBR can be controlled for. Such a hedging strategy becomes 
particularly policy-relevant if there is uncertainty about leakage exposure for individual sectors. The 
actual practice in EU climate policy sheds some light on the issue at stake. In the EU ETS, sectors that 
are “exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage” receive a high share of free allowances.6 A 
majority of industry sectors have been put into this group. In contrast, Sato et al. (2015) find that 
“vulnerable sectors account for small shares of emission”, and Martin et al. (2014) conclude that the 
current allocation results in “substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk”. Note that 
supplementing OBR with a consumption tax does not only provide a hedge against uncertainty on data 
grounds but also with respect to lobbying activities by industries. 
 
There is a large body of literature on carbon leakage. The seminal paper by Markusen (1975) derives 
the first-best combination of a domestic emission tax and a tariff on imported goods (in his model, 
emissions are functions of production only), where the optimal tariff depends on both leakage and 
terms-of-trade effects. In a similar vein, Hoel (1996) determines an optimal combination of an 
emission tax and a carbon tariff (or export subsidy), where he also includes the indirect emission 
effects of the tariff (see also Copeland, 1996, for an early analytical contribution). 
 
Many numerical modeling studies quantify carbon leakage, the bulk of them using multi-region and 
multi-sector CGE models of the world economy. For policy-relevant parameters on key dimensions – 
such as the stringency of emission regulation or the size of the abatement coalition – most studies 
conclude that the leakage rate of a unilateral carbon tax (or emissions trading) is in the range of 5-
                                                     
6 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/leakage/index_en.htm  
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30%, i.e., a reduction of 100 units of CO2 in the regulating country leads to an increase of 5-30 units of 
CO2 in non-regulating countries (see, e.g., the review by Zhang, 2012, and the special issue edited by 
Böhringer et al., 2012a). There are, however, a few outliers with negative leakage (Elliott and 
Fullerton, 2014) or leakage rates above 100% (Babiker, 2005), adopting less conventional assumptions 
on international factor mobility or market power. Studies that calculate leakage from single EITE 
industries often find somewhat higher leakage rates (e.g., Ponssard and Walker, 2008, and Fischer and 
Fox, 2012) since competitiveness losses get relatively more pronounced. 
 
Leakage mainly occurs through two intertwined channels. In this paper we focus on leakage through 
the market for EITE goods, often referred to as the competitiveness channel. The second channel is the 
so-called fossil-fuel channel: Reduced demand for fossil fuels in climate policy regions depresses 
international fuel prices, stimulating fuel consumption and thus emissions in other regions (Felder and 
Rutherford, 1993). The policy debate focuses on leakage through the competitiveness channel, 
mirroring concerns of regulated EITE industries on adverse competitiveness effects. The policy focus 
goes also along with broader scope of policy options – such as BCA or OBR – to mitigate leakage 
through EITE markets rather than leakage through fossil fuel markets.  
 
Our paper also relates to a strand of literature that examines consumption taxes in environmental 
regulation, either alone or in combination with other instruments. In particular, Holland (2012) shows 
that adding a consumption tax to an emission intensity standard can improve efficiency of unilateral 
climate policy, as standards trigger inefficiently high consumption. Tradable intensity targets can be 
re-interpreted as a combination of an emission price and OBR – in this respect, Holland’s finding is 
comparable with our result on the efficiency gains through supplemental consumption taxes. However, 
Holland’s model includes only one good, with domestic and foreign goods being homogenous, 
whereas we use a model with three goods, with domestic and foreign goods being either homogenous 
or heterogeneous. Eichner and Pethig (2015a) examine consumption-based taxes as an alternative to 
emission (production-based) taxes in a two-period two-country analytical general equilibrium model 
with a finite stock of fossil fuels, concluding that consumption-based taxes may reduce the cost of 
unilateral climate policy. In follow-up work, Eichner and Pethig (2015b) show that a combination of 
production- and consumption-based taxes outperform production-based taxation stand-alone. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out our theoretical model and 
analyze the optimal consumption tax in a situation where an emission tax combined with OBR is 
already in place; we then demonstrate the equivalence between BCA and the combination of OBR and 
8 
consumption tax. In Section 3, we develop a stylized computable general equilibrium model calibrated 
to empirical data for the world economy and substantiate our analytical results with numerical 
simulations. Section 4 concludes.  
2. Analytical model 
We consider a model with two regions,  1,2j  , and three goods x, y and z. Good x is emission-free 
and tradable, good y is emission-intensive and tradable, while good z is emission-intensive and non-
tradable.7 Same goods produced in different regions are assumed to be homogenous,8 with no trade 
cost (for the two tradable goods). We interpret y as emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) 
sectors where output-based rebating is considered (e.g., chemicals, metal and other mineral 
production), and z as sectors where leakage is of less concern (e.g. electricity production and 
transport). The market prices (excluding taxes) of goods x, y and z in region j are denoted pxj, pyj and 
pzj, respectively.  
 
The representative consumer’s utility from consumption in region j is given by   , ,j j jju x y z , where 
 jx , 
j
y  and jz  denote consumption of the three goods. The utility function is twice differentiable, 
increasing and strictly concave; i.e., we have / 0, 0, 0j j j j jx y zu u x u u      and the Hessian matrix 
is negative definite.  
Production of good x in region j is 1 2j j jx x x  , where xij denotes goods produced in region j and sold 
in region i. We use similar notation for good y. The market equilibrium conditions are then: 
 
(1) 
 
 
1 21 2
1 21 2
jj
x x x x
y y y y
z z
  
  
 
 . 
 
Cost of producing good x, y and z in region j is given by  xj jc x ,  ,yj j yjc y e  and  ,ezj j zjc z , 
respectively, with eyj and ezj denoting emissions. We assume that cost is increasing in production for 
                                                     
7 Note that we use emission(-intensive) and carbon(-intensive) interchangeably throughout the text, as we want to adhere to 
the established terms “emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE)” and “border carbon adjustment (BCA)”. 
8 Thus, only net trade matters for each good in this model. In Appendix A we show that our results generalize to 
heterogeneous goods (see Corollary 3), and in the simulations in Section 3 we consider both homogenous and heterogeneous 
goods. 
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all goods, and that cost of producing y and z is decreasing in emissions; more precisely, , , 0xj yj zjx y zc c c   
and , 0y j z je ec c  , with strict inequality when emissions are regulated. Further, cost is assumed to be 
twice differentiable and strictly convex. Last, all derivatives are assumed to be finite. 
2.1 Output-based rebating and consumption tax 
For our analysis we assume that region 1 undertakes unilateral emission regulation and disposes of 
three policy instruments (variables): an emission tax t1, an output subsidy s1 to production of good y, 
and a consumption tax v1 on buying good y. Without uncertainty, output-based rebating (OBR) is 
equivalent with an output subsidy, where the subsidy is linked to the emission tax. In particular, if the 
tax revenues are fully redistributed back to the producers, the implicit subsidy of OBR is 
1 1 1 1/ys t e y , a case we will refer to as 100% OBR.9 We assume no climate policy in region 2, i.e., t2 
= s2 = v2 = 0. 
 
Competitive producers in region j maximize profits: 
     
1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2
,
1 1 2 2
, ,
max ( )
max ( , )
max ( , )
j j
j j j
j
x j x j xj j
x x
y j j y j j yj j yj j yj
y y e
zj j zj j zj j zj
z
p x p x c x
p s y p s y c y e t e
p z c z e t e
   
      
   
 . 
 
This gives the following first-order conditions for an interior solution: 
(2) 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
;
; 0
x x x x
x x
y y y y y y
y y
zj zj
z
y z y z
e e e e
p p c c
p s p s c p p c
p c
c c t c c
  
     

    
 . 
 
Note that an interior solution requires that there is one global price for each of the tradable goods x and 
y, as both goods are homogenous with no trade cost (this is not the case with heterogeneous goods, see 
Corollary 3 and the proof in Appendix A). The domestic emission tax t1 induces higher cost of 
producing good y in region 1, which implies higher output and emissions in region 2 through the 
                                                     
9 Most studies of OBR in the literature consider 100% rebating. In the EU ETS, the most leakage-exposed industries, 
accounting for more than half of total emissions from installations that receive free allowances, have around 100% rebating 
on average. Note that this does not mean that the allowances they receive cover all their needs, as ey1 in the expression above 
denotes regulated emissions, which typically are lower than baseline emissions. Meunier et al. (2014) argue that the 
allocation mechanism in the EU ETS may be better characterized by capacity-based allocation, as new (and expansion of 
existing) installations receive allowances in proportion to their installed capacity. 
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international market for good y. The motivation for the subsidy s1 (or OBR) is to target this leakage by 
driving a wedge between marginal production cost in region 1 and the market price on good y, and 
hence to stimulate domestic output of this good. The net effect of t1 and s1 on y1 is ambiguous.  
The representative consumer in region j maximizes utility, given consumer prices and a budget 
restriction. After constructing the Lagrangian function and then differentiating, we get the following 
first-order conditions: 
 
(3) , ,j xj j yj j j zjx y zu p u p v u p    .  
 
We assume that the regions have a balance-of-payment constraint, so that import expenditures must 
equal export revenues in both regions. Net export for region j is equal to production minus 
consumption in that region, i.e.,  jjx x  and  jjy y . Using 1 2y y yp p p   and 1 2x x xp p p   
from the first-order conditions in (2), we have: 
 
(4)     0j jy j x jp y y p x x    . 
2.2 The optimal consumption tax under OBR  
Regional welfare maximization 
We now want to derive the optimal consumption tax on good y in region 1, given that the region has 
already implemented an emission tax (t1) on goods y and z, combined with OBR (s1) to good y. 
Welfare in region 1 is given by: 
(5)  1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )x y y z z y y z zW u x y z c x c y e c z e e e e e        ,  
 
where τ is the shadow cost of emissions, i.e., the Pigouvian tax. We assume that emissions abroad are 
valued by the same shadow cost as emissions at home. This is a reasonable assumption for greenhouse 
gas emissions, with spatially independent emissions damage. We then have the following result:  
 
Lemma 1. Let welfare in region 1 be given by equation (5), and assume that the emission tax is set 
equal to the Pigouvian tax , i.e., 1t  .Then the welfare maximizing consumption tax v1* on good y is 
given by: 
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(6) 

   

   
   
 
11 1 2 2 2 2 1 11* 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
y z y x
b d eca
y y e y e z p pv s y y x x
v v y v z v v v

                                      
 
.  
 
Proof. See Appendix A.  
The first factor (a) in (6) is negative, as a higher consumption tax on good y in region 1 reduces 
consumption of this good in that region (see Appendix A). Hence, the sign of v1* is the opposite of the 
sign of the square bracket.  
 
Inside the square bracket the first term (b) is negative, as reduced demand for good y in region 1 
reduces the market price of y and hence output of good y in both regions. This term reflects that the 
OBR-subsidy, which reduces leakage through depressing foreign production, has a negative side effect 
as it leads to too much consumption (marginal production cost in region 1 exceeds the consumer price 
in both regions). The optimal consumption tax corrects for this.  
 
The two next terms capture emission effects in region 2, which abstains from emission regulation. 
Term (c) is negative by the same reasoning as for term (b), and the fact that emissions are increasing in 
output. The sign on term (d) is a priori ambiguous and depends on the cross derivatives of the utility 
function in region 2, in particular whether z is a complement or a substitute to good y. As the 
consumption tax reduces the price of y, consumption of this good in region 2 increases. This will tend 
to reduce the consumption of other goods, and hence production of the non-tradable z good, in region 
2 unless y and z are complements (in consumption). Moreover, because z is typically dominated by 
electricity generation and transport, and electricity is an important input into production of many EITE 
goods, reduced output of y in region 2 will also tend to decrease consumption (and thus production) of 
z. For these two reasons, we find it likely that the sign of 2 1/z v   is negative. In any case, it is very 
likely that this second-order effect is dominated by the first-order effect (c). We will henceforth make 
the following assumption: 
(7) 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 0
y ze y e z
y v z v
        , 
 
which of course is always true if 2 1/ 0z v   .10  
                                                     
10 In the simulations in Section 3, the sign of 2 1/z v   is consistently negative.  
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The last term (e) captures terms-of-trade effects. Whereas the price of good y (py) decreases, the price 
of good x (px) will increase due to increased demand. If region 1 is initially a net importer (exporter) of 
good y and net exporter (importer) of good x, both last terms are negative (positive). Note that the 
balance of payments constraint (4) requires that if region 1 imports good y, it must export good x (and 
vice versa). Hence, we have shown the following result:  
 
Proposition 1. Consider a region that combines a Pigouvian tax on emissions with a subsidy to 
production of an emission-intensive, tradable good y, and considers a consumption tax on good y. 
Then we have:  
- The optimal consumption tax on good y is unambiguously positive if the region is not a net ex-
porter of good y. 
- If the region is a net exporter of good y, then the optimal consumption tax on good y is posi-
tive if and only if the disadvantageous terms-of-trade effects are dominated by the beneficial 
effects from reducing excessive production of good y and emissions abroad. 
Proof. The proposition follows from equations (4), (6) and (7).  
Global welfare maximization 
So far, we have assumed that region 1’s policy objective when setting the consumption tax is to 
maximize welfare in region 1. To assess unilateral climate policy design from a global welfare 
perspective, we consider the case where region 1 is concerned about effects on global welfare, 
including the cost of emissions as before.11 Global welfare is: 
(8)    
1,2
( , , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )
j j jG j xj j yj j yj zj j zj yj zj
j
W u x y z c x c y e c z e e e

          .  
 
The consumption tax v1** that maximizes global welfare (8) is given by (see Appendix A): 
(9) 
 11 1 2 2 2 2
1** 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 0
y zy y e y e zv s
v v y v z v

                        
.  
 
We observe that equation (9) is equal to equation (6) when terms-of-trade effects are zero. Thus, we 
have the following result: 
                                                     
11 For example, in Böhringer et al. (2014a), a coalition of countries concerned about leakage chooses the policy that 
maximizes global welfare. Böhringer et al. (2014b) decomposes leakage and terms-of-trade motives of differential sector-
specific emission pricing, as such pricing can be used as a “beggar-thy-neighbor policy” to exploit terms of trade. 
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Proposition 2. Consider a region that combines a Pigouvian tax on emissions with a subsidy to 
production of an emission-intensive, tradable good y. If the regulator in this region maximizes global 
welfare, then the optimal consumption tax on good y in this region is unambiguously positive. 
 
Proof. The proposition follows from equations (7) and (9). 
There are some special cases worth elaborating on. To simplify the discussion, we focus on the global 
welfare perspective in Proposition 2 and equation (9), in which case there is no terms-of-trade effect. 
First, the optimal consumption tax on good y obviously increases in the OBR subsidy s1. However, we 
also observe that the tax is unambiguously positive also without OBR (i.e., s1 = 0). The reason is that 
reduced domestic demand for good y reduces imports of y, and hence reduces environmental damages 
from emissions abroad (emissions at home are already accounted for by the emission tax). Thus, in the 
case where region 1 has implemented (only) a Pigouvian tax, the region should also tax consumption 
of emission-intensive, tradable goods. We state this finding in the following corollary:12 
 
Corollary 1. Consider a region that has implemented a Pigouvian tax on emissions. Then the optimal 
consumption tax on an emission-intensive, tradable good y is unambiguously positive if the regulator 
in region 1 maximizes global welfare. 
 
Proof. The corollary follows from the discussion above. 
Next, we see from equation (9) that if production and consumption in region 2 is unaffected by the 
consumption tax in region 1, e.g. because of no trade between the two regions, the optimal 
consumption tax is equal to the OBR subsidy, i.e., 1** 1v s . It follows that if domestic production and 
consumption change much more than foreign production and consumption, the optimal consumption 
tax is close to the OBR-rate. This could be the case if region 1 is much bigger than region 2.  
 
The reason for this result is that the motivation for OBR is to mitigate emission leakage (and loss in 
competitiveness) induced by unilateral emission regulation. However, the effects of this policy are not 
only to shift market shares towards the domestic firm, but also to stimulate excessive use of this good. 
Therefore, the regulator would want the consumption tax to reduce the demand for good y. In this 
special case, when impacts in region 2 are negligible compared to in region 1, the optimal 
consumption tax completely offsets the distortion to the economy caused by the OBR subsidy. The 
intuition is straightforward: leakage is not an important issue when the domestic region is much larger 
                                                     
12 A similar result is found by Eichner and Pethig (2015b), who demonstrate that a combination of production-based (i.e., 
emission) and consumption-based taxes is less expensive than a production-based tax alone. 
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than the foreign region. Hence, introducing OBR is not a good idea in the first place, and the optimal 
consumption tax negates the effects of OBR.  
 
The same result holds if the size of region 2 is more comparable with region 1, but both production 
and consumption in region 2 are insensitive to the climate policy in region 1. In our model with 
homogenous goods, this would be the case if, e.g., both the marginal cost and marginal utility for good 
y in region 2 are very steep. In a model with heterogeneous goods (see the numerical analysis in 
Section 3), the substitution elasticities between domestic and foreign goods are also important for how 
sensitive foreign consumption and production are to the domestic climate policy. 
 
In policy practice, it may be difficult to determine how exposed a sector really is to leakage and, 
correspondingly, whether or not it should be included in an OBR regime. The above results suggest 
that a policy which combines OBR with a consumption tax is more robust with respect to uncertainties 
about leakage than OBR alone. The reason is that, because the consumption tax offsets the distortive 
effects of the output subsidy, the negative consequences of including too many sectors in an OBR-
regime are reduced when the consumption tax is added.  
 
Another policy-relevant special case is 100% OBR, i.e., 1 1 1 1/ys t e y  (see above). Given a Pigouvian 
emission tax ( 1t  ), this implies 1 1 1/es y e  . To simplify the line of reasoning, we first assume that 
the average emissions intensity of good y in region 1 is equal to the marginal emissions intensity in 
region 2, i.e., 1 1 2 2/ /y ye y e y   . Equation (9) then becomes (using the market equilibrium for y): 
 
  1 11 2 1 1 2 2
1** 1
1 1 1 1 2 11
z
y
y y y y e zv s
v v v e z v
                           
 .  
 
We know that consumption in region 1 decreases and consumption in region 2 increases in the 
consumption tax in region 1. Hence, the sum of the two first terms inside the square bracket is less 
than one. Thus, if 2 1/z v   is positive or sufficiently small in absolute value, we have 1** 1v s . That is, 
contrary to the first special case, the regulator does not wish to completely offset the OBR subsidy, 
because the tax also stimulates consumption in region 2. For instance, if the tax only shifts 
consumption from region 1 to region 2, with no net effects on production, the tax has no impact on 
emissions and the optimal consumption tax is zero. More generally, the more the consumption tax is 
able to reduce overall production rather than shifting consumption abroad, the higher should the tax 
be.  
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On the other hand, it may be more reasonable to assume 1 1 2 2/ /y ye y e y   , as the emission tax will 
reduce the emission intensity in region 1. Hence, v1** is not necessarily lower than s1, and could exceed 
the subsidy if the emissions intensity in region 2 is significantly higher than in region 1 and the 
consumption tax affects global production more than consumption in region 2. In the simulations in 
Section 3, the optimal consumption tax is in the range 80-100% when global welfare is maximized. 
2.4  Equivalence between border carbon adjustment and OBR with consumption 
tax  
In this subsection we show that the combination of OBR and consumption tax on good y is equivalent 
to a certain specification of border carbon adjustment (BCA) on good y (assuming that the same 
emission tax is in place). Let 1  denote the carbon tariff on imports of good y to region 1, and let 1  
denote the export rebate to exports of good y from region 1. We still assume no climate policy in 
region 2, so that 2 2 2 0t    . 
 
A carbon tariff is an import tariff on the embodied carbon in the imported good, proportional to the 
emission price in the importing region. Ideally, the tariff should reflect the emission intensity of the 
exporting firm, giving this firm an incentive to reduce emissions. However, such a system may be 
difficult and costly to implement, and hence analysis of carbon tariffs usually assume that the tariff is 
determined based on some average emission intensity. This average can either be the average emission 
intensity in the exporting region (which could be differentiated across regions if there were more than 
one export region), or the average emission intensity in the importing region.13 Ismer and Neuhoff 
(2007) and Monjon and Quirion (2011b) argue that non-differentiated tariffs are more likely to be 
compatible with the WTO rules, and this is what we consider here. Furthermore, we base the tariff on 
the emission intensity in the import region, i.e., 1 1 1 1/yt e y  . Export rebates under BCA proposals are 
usually set equal to 1 1 1 1/yt e y  , so the export rebate and the carbon tariff are equal in this case. 
Moreover, we notice that 1 1 1s    in the case of 100% OBR.  
 
The maximization problems for producers of goods x and z under BCA are equal to the OBR case. 
Hence, their first-order conditions are as given in equation (2). Producers of good y in region j 
maximize profits: 
     1 2 1 1 2 2,y ,emax (y ,e )j j j y i j y j j yj j yj j yjy p y p y c t e         , 
                                                     
13 Both these variants are examined in the literature (see, e.g., Böhringer et al., 2012b; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; and Mattoo et 
al., 2009). 
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where i≠j. This gives the following first-order conditions for an interior solution: 
(10) 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2
;
; 0
y y y y y y
y y
y y
e e
p p c p p c
c t c
      
    . 
 
For producers in region 1, the net price home and abroad are 1yp  and 2 1yp  , respectively, while 
for producers in region 2, the net price home and abroad are 2yp  and 1 1yp  , respectively. An 
interior solution requires equal net prices on exports and domestic sales, implying 1 2 1y yp p    and 
2 1 1y yp p   . That is, the price in region 1 must exceed the price in region 2 by the amount 
1 1y  . Notice that if we had specified the carbon tariff differently, so that 1 1  , we would not 
have an interior solution in this model with homogenous goods.14 
 
The consumer utility maximization problem is similar as under OBR and a consumption tax, but with 
0jv   in (3). The budget constraint under BCA is still given by equation (4), where py denotes the 
international price of good y and also the price in region 2 ( 2y yp p ). The first-order conditions for 
good y in (2), (3) and (10) may then be rewritten as in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. First-order conditions for good y under unilateral regulation  
 OBR+Consumption Tax BCA 
Production 1 1 2;y y y yy yp s c p c    1 1 2;y y y yy yp c p c    
Abatement 1 1 2; 0y ye ec t c    1 1 2; 0y ye ec t c    
Consumption  1 1 2;y yy yu p v u p    1 1 2;y yy yu p u p    
 
In addition, equilibrium requires the market equilibrium condition (1) and the budget constraint (4) to 
hold under both types of regulation. It is also straightforward to see that net government revenues are 
the same in the two cases. 
 
We then have the following result: 
                                                     
14 In a model with heterogeneous goods, interior solution is feasible also when the carbon tariff deviates from the export 
rebate. However, equivalence still requires that these are identical, see (the proof of) Corollary 3 and the numerical analysis 
in Section 3. 
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Proposition 3. The two types of regulation i) emission tax with OBR and consumption tax, and ii) 
emission tax with BCA as specified above, induce equal production, consumption and emissions in 
both regions if 1 1 1 1v s     .  
 
Proof. According to Table 1, all first-order conditions for good y are equal. Moreover, first-order 
conditions (2) and (3) for the goods x and z are equal, too. Market equilibrium conditions and budget 
constraints for all goods are given by equations (1) and (4), respectively, in both cases. The second-
order conditions put identical constraints on the cost and utility functions under both types of 
regulations. The proposition follows.  
 
Proposition 3 implies that under certain conditions, combining output-based rebating with a 
consumption tax has the same effect as full border carbon adjustment. As BCA is regarded as more 
contentious, though more effective than OBR, combining OBR with a consumption tax can be a viable 
policy alternative to implementing BCA. 
 
In the discussion leading up to Proposition 3, we assumed that the carbon tariff is determined based on 
the emission intensity in region 1. However, it is straightforward to see that the proposition also may 
hold for different levels of carbon tariffs, given that the export rebate is equal to the tariff. Then by 
adjusting the OBR rate and the consumption tax accordingly, the equivalence still holds. The only 
requirement is that 1 1 1 1v s     . Thus, if the regulator in region 1 would like to impose a higher 
carbon tariff (and export rebate) than the one following from the domestic emission intensity, e.g., 
because emission intensities abroad are higher than at home, the same result can be achieved by 
imposing a combination of OBR and consumption tax. We state this generalization as a separate 
corollary: 
 
Corollary 2. The two types of regulation i) emission tax with OBR and consumption tax, and ii) 
emission tax with BCA, are equivalent for any level of carbon tariff as long as 1 1 1 1v s     .  
 
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 3. 
Whereas the motivation for OBR and BCA typically is to mitigate carbon leakage through the 
international product markets, the assumption that the good y is homogeneous and independent of 
region of origin is unrealistic for many emission-intensive and trade-exposed goods. Moreover, with 
several EITE goods exposed to leakage, these will typically have different carbon tariffs in a BCA 
system. It is straightforward to show that the propositions above carry over to the case with several 
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heterogeneous EITE-goods. For the equivalence result in Proposition 3, this requires that the output-
based rebating is good specific, i.e., emission payments from the production of one specific good is 
rebated back to producers of this specific good. We states these findings in the following corollary: 
 
Corollary 3. Consider the case with  1,2,...,m M  EITE goods denoted ym, where each good is 
produced in both regions, and goods produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes. Then we 
have the following:  
- The optimal consumption tax on good ym is unambiguously positive if the regulator in region 1 
maximizes global welfare.  
- The two types of regulations i) emission tax with OBR and consumption tax, and ii) emission 
tax with BCA as specified above, are equivalent if 1 1 1 1v s     .15  
Proof. See Appendix A. 
In the numerical simulations below we will consider both homogenous and heterogeneous EITE-
goods, but restrict ourselves to the case with one EITE-good in each region. 
3. Stylized Numerical Analysis 
We transfer our theoretical analysis to numerical simulations with a stylized computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model to accommodate more functional (real-word) complexity to gain insights 
into the magnitude of economic effects based on empirical data. Below we first summarize the main 
characteristics of the numerical model in a non-technical manner (see Appendix B for an algebraic 
model summary). We then discuss the parameterization of the model based on empirical data. Finally, 
we describe the specification of illustrative policy scenarios and interpret the simulation results. 
3.1 Non-technical model summary 
We consider two regions (1 and 2) with four production sectors: carbon-free and tradable production 
(NC_T), carbon-intensive and tradable production (C_T), carbon-intensive and non-tradable 
production (C_NT), and fossil energy production (FE). Sectors NC_T, C_T, and C_NT correspond to 
the goods x, y and z, respectively, in our theoretical model of Section 2. In the numerical model, these 
goods can be used both as intermediate inputs into production and in final consumption. Emissions are 
modelled as proportional to energy use. To keep in line with the analytical model, energy can neither 
                                                     
15 1 1 1, ,m m mv s   and 1m  denote the consumption tax, the output subsidy, the carbon tariff and the export rebate on good ym in 
region 1, respectively.  
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be used in final consumption nor can it be traded between regions. Thus, we implicitly suppress the 
fossil-fuel channel for carbon leakage, as we want to focus on the competitiveness channel examined 
in the theoretical analysis. 
 
Primary factors of production include labor, capital, and specific energy resources. Labor and capital 
are intersectorally mobile within a region but immobile between regions. The energy resource is 
specific to the energy production sector.  
 
Producers combine primary factors and intermediate inputs at minimum cost subject to technological 
constraints. Production of non-energy goods is captured by three-level constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) cost functions describing the price-responsive demand for capital, labor, energy and 
other intermediate inputs. At the top level, non-energy intermediate inputs trade off with a composite 
of energy, capital and labor, subject to a constant elasticity of substitution. At the second level, a CES 
function describes the substitution possibilities between energy and a value-added composite of labor 
and capital. At the third level, capital and labor enter the CES value-added composite. In the 
production of energy, all inputs except for the specific energy resource are combined in fixed 
proportions. This Leontief composite trades off with the energy resource at a constant elasticity of 
substitution.  
 
Final consumption demand in each region is determined by the representative agent who maximizes 
welfare subject to a budget constraint. Total income of the representative household consists of factor 
income and net revenues from emission regulation. Consumption demand of the representative agent 
is given as a CES composite of final consumption goods. Figures B1-B3 in Appendix B sketch the 
nesting of functional forms in production and consumption together with the default elasticities 
underlying our central case simulations. 
 
As emissions are linked in fixed proportions to the use of energy, emission reductions in response to 
emission pricing will take place by energy savings. The latter can take place either through 
substitution of energy through other non-energy inputs or through scale reduction of production and 
final demand activities. 
 
Only the two goods C_T and NC_T can be traded bilaterally (with no transport cost). A balance of 
payment constraint incorporates the base-year trade deficit or surplus for each region. The stylized 
model can reflect two alternative trade paradigms – either trade in homogeneous goods or trade in 
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heterogeneous goods. In case of heterogeneous goods, we follow Armington’s differentiated goods 
approach, where domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by origin (Armington, 1969). All goods 
used on the domestic market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a CES composite that 
combines the domestically produced good and the imported good from the other region. The size of 
the (Armington) substitution elasticities determine how close substitutes goods produced in different 
regions are. In case of homogeneous trade, only net trade flows matter such that there is no 
crosshauling.  
3.2 Data and parametrization 
As to parameterization, we adopt the standard calibration procedure in applied general equilibrium 
analysis in which a balanced base-year dataset determines the free parameters of the functional forms 
(i.e., cost and expenditure functions) such that the economic flows represented in the data are 
consistent with the optimizing behavior of the economic agents.  
 
To have the stylized numerical analysis closely related with our theoretical exposition, we restructure 
an empirical dataset in line with the fundamental settings of the theoretical part. Our dataset is based 
on the most recent GTAP data for the world economy (base-year 2011) with 57 sectors and 140 
regions. We first map all 57 GTAP sectors to the four composite sectors in our model (see Table C1 in 
Appendix C). Then we construct a social accounting matrix (SAM) for the global economy based on 
the GTAP data. Since the NC_T good is assumed to be carbon-free, we set (fossil) energy use in this 
sector equal to zero.16 
 
Next, we divide the world into two identical regions to follow the symmetry assumption in the 
theoretical analysis.17 Thus, each entry in the SAM for region j is half of the corresponding entry in the 
global SAM. As there is no trade in the global SAM, we have to make an assumption about initial 
trade volumes between the two regions. For each of the two goods C_T and NC_T we simply assume 
that 50% of the trade observed in 2011 (according to the GTAP data) takes place between regions 1 
and 2. As mentioned before, we assume no trade for C_NT and FE. The derived SAM for each region 
is displayed in Table C2 in Appendix C.  
                                                     
16 In the original GTAP dataset, this sector only accounts for 3-4% of total fossil energy use. 
17 This implies that there are no terms-of-trade effects at the margin (before any policy is implemented). 
21 
3.3 Scenarios 
Our reference scenario (REF) for unilateral climate policy is a situation where a single country (or 
country coalition) – here: region 1 – undertakes uniform emission pricing to achieve an exogenous 
domestic emission reduction target.18 In our central case simulations, we set the unilateral emission 
reduction target at 20 percent of the base-year emissions. We use the stylized numerical model to 
quantify how the REF outcome changes if the region adopts in addition either full border carbon 
adjustment (BCA), or output-based rebating combined with a consumption tax (OBR+Tax). In both 
cases, the additional policies are directed only towards the C_T good, i.e., the emission-intensive and 
trade-exposed commodity. In the BCA case, the carbon tariff and the export rebate are determined 
based on the domestic emission intensity (see Section 2). In the OBR+Tax case, we assume full 
rebating and consider different levels of the consumption tax, which is applied to both final 
consumption and intermediate use of the C_T good. We indicate the different levels of the 
consumption tax as a fraction v of the OBR rate where we increase v subsequently in steps of 20 
percentage points from 0% to 200%. Obviously, OBR+Tax includes output-based rebating stand-alone 
as a special case when we set the consumption tax to zero (v=0%). As demonstrated in our theoretical 
analysis (see Proposition 3 and Corollary 3), OBR+Tax is equivalent to BCA when the consumption 
tax is set equal (v=100%) to the implicit output subsidy under output-based rebating. 
 
Table 4. Policy scenarios for region 1 
REF Emission price only 
OBR+Tax Output-based rebating + consumption tax for the 
carbon-intensive and tradable good (C_T ) 
BCA Border carbon adjustment 
 
Considering that the climate is a global public good, a coherent cross-comparison of results requires 
that we keep global emissions constant unless we can value the damage from emissions. Here, we do 
not attempt to trade off the abatement cost with the benefit from avoided climate change but restrain 
ourselves to a cost-effectiveness analysis. Therefore, we require the abating region to adjust its 
unilateral emissions reduction effort such that a given global emission cap is maintained. The cap is 
taken as the global emission level which emerges from scenario REF. If additional policy measures 
such as OBR+Tax turn out to reduce leakage compared to REF, then the effective unilateral emission 
reduction requirement will be lower than the REF target.  
                                                     
18 Uniform emission pricing to achieve some emission reduction target can either be implemented through an emission tax 
which is set at a sufficiently high level or equivalently through an emissions cap-and-trade system. 
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A key parameter regarding the magnitude of emission leakage through the competitiveness channel is 
the Armington elasticity. The choice of the Armington elasticity determines the ease of substitution 
between the domestically produced good and its foreign counterpart. The higher this elasticity, the 
more pronounced leakage ceteris paribus becomes. To investigate the robustness of our findings, we 
provide simulation results for alternative choices of the Armington elasticity ranging from a lower end 
value of 1, via the benchmark elasticity in GTAP of 4, to an upper end value of 8. For an infinite 
Armington elasticity the heterogeneous goods setting transforms into the case of homogenous goods 
which has been the reference in our theoretical analysis. We include the case with homogenous goods 
in our results exposition below by referring to an infinite Armington elasticity.  
3.4 Results 
 In our results discussion, we first check if the equivalence result between BCA and OBR+Tax holds 
(when v=100%). We then investigate changes in leakage rates, welfare, and production output as the 
key indicators of policy interest. The leakage rate is defined as the ratio of the emission change in the 
non-abating region over the emission reduction in the abating region. Welfare effects are defined as 
Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in income as a percentage of the pre-policy equilibrium levels – 
the so-called business-as-usual (BAU). 
 
We find that the numerical results are in accordance with the equivalence results in Proposition 3 and 
Corollary 3. That is, given emissions pricing (tax or quotas), the combination of output-based rebating 
and a consumption tax equal to the OBR rate (OBR+Tax with v=100%) gives exactly the same 
outcome as border carbon adjustment (BCA). This equivalence result is robust independent of whether 
we assume homogenous or heterogeneous goods (with various Armington elasticities).  
 
Next we turn to leakage mitigation which is a central policy justification for supplementing unilateral 
emission pricing with either OBR or BCA. Previous studies have suggested that BCA is more effective 
in leakage mitigation than OBR. Figure 1 shows how the combination of OBR+Tax affects leakage 
across alternative choices of the Armington elasticity as we increase the consumption tax from 0% to 
200% of the OBR rate (note that v=0% and v=100% are replaced with respectively OBR and BCA in 
all the figures). As expected, leakage rates go up with higher Armington elasticities, and becomes very 
high with homogenous goods. Further, Figure 1 clearly shows that introducing OBR reduces the 
leakage rate significantly, and more so the higher is the Armington elasticity. The leakage rates in fact 
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become negative in all three cases with heterogeneous goods.19 Next, we notice that the consumption 
tax decreases leakage further: When the consumption tax rate is set equivalent to the OBR rate (BCA) 
the leakage rate drops by another 2-9 percentage points compared to OBR. We also can see that 
leakage is further reduced when the consumption tax is increased beyond 100%. 
 
Figure 1. Leakage rates under different policy scenarios and Armington elasticities (in %) 
 
 
Figure 2. Emission price under different policy scenarios and Armington elasticities (in Euro per 
ton CO2) 
 
                                                     
19 Note that we deliberately suppress the fossil-fuel channel in our analysis, which makes leakage rates rather low to start 
with in the REF scenario (relative to most numerical analysis in the literature featuring both the fossil-fuel as well as the 
competitiveness channel), and explains why anti-leakage measures have a strong potential to drive leakage rates even 
negative. If we include the fossil fuel channel by allowing for trade in energy, none of our qualitative findings changes. 
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As mentioned before, a main difference between OBR and the consumption tax is that the former 
stimulates domestic supply while the latter dampens domestic demand. Hence, OBR will tend to 
increase domestic emissions, while the consumption tax has the opposite effect. Figure 2 shows the 
endogenous emission prices needed to reach the same global emission target (across policy scenarios 
for a given choice of Armington elasticity). Although OBR leads to lower leakage (as shown in Figure 
1), the first order effect of higher domestic output of the C_T good dominates with respect to global 
emissions, implying a higher necessary emission price under OBR than under REF. If the consumption 
tax is introduced, however, a lower emission price is needed.  
 
In Figure 3 we show how the policies affect economic welfare in region 1. Since we assume that 
global emissions are the same across all policy scenarios, we do not have to value emission changes. 
We first notice that the welfare effects of OBR are positive in the case of homogenous goods. In this 
case, the implicit subsidy given by OBR reduces the inefficient relocation of production from region 1 
to region 2. On the other hand, if the substitution possibilities between domestic and foreign goods are 
more limited, then the distortionary negative effect of subsidising this good becomes relatively more 
important and dominates the former positive effect. In all the three cases with heterogeneous goods, 
the welfare cost for region 1 increases rather than decreases when shifting from emission pricing only 
(REF) to emission pricing combined with OBR (but only marginally with the Armington elasticity at a 
value of 8).  
 
Figure 3. Welfare effects (HEV) for region 1 under different policy scenarios and Armington 
elasticities (% change from business-as-usual) 
 
 
Figure 3 furthermore shows that it is welfare improving for region 1 to implement a consumption tax 
when output-based rebating is already in place, which is in line with Proposition 1 of our theoretical 
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analysis. This holds irrespective of the choice of Armington elasticity. The optimal consumption tax 
level is in the range 80-160% of the OBR-rate in the simulated cases. With homogenous goods, the 
benefits of the consumption tax are rather modest. With heterogeneous goods, the benefits are more 
pronounced, and more so the lower is the Armington elasticity. In the case with Armington elasticity 
equal to 1, the welfare costs are reduced by one third when OBR is supplemented with a consumption 
tax of 100% of the OBR-rate (i.e., the BCA case). If the consumption tax is increased to 160%, the 
welfare costs are approximately the same as in the REF case, i.e., emission pricing only. 
 
The numerical results provide evidence that OBR may serve as a decent second-best policy for goods 
that are much exposed to foreign competition, due to high substitutability between domestic and 
foreign goods, but not so for goods that are less exposed. Moreover, supplementing OBR with a 
consumption tax is beneficial whether or not the good is much exposed to foreign competition. Thus, 
when output-based rebating is applied to a certain group of goods, the policy-relevant conclusion from 
our analysis is to also introduce a corresponding tax on all purchases of the same goods. 
 
A relevant question to ask is whether the findings in Figure 3 are due to efficiency improvements, or 
whether it is due to terms-of-trade benefits for region 1 at the expense of region 2. Although we start 
from an initial BAU situation with no net trade in either of the tradable goods, the REF scenario is 
characterized by net export of the C_T good from region 2 to region 1 (and vice versa for the NC_T 
good). As both OBR and the consumption tax reduce the relative price of the C_T good (over the 
NC_T good), terms-of-trade effects for region 1 are positive as we move towards the right from REF 
in Figure 3.  
 
In order to examine this more closely, we first consider the case where region 1 must provide a 
transfer to region 2 so that welfare in the latter region does not decrease vis-à-vis the REF case. The 
qualitative findings are then very similar to the ones in Figure 3, i.e., the optimal consumption tax is in 
the range 80-140%, and the welfare gains increase notably we lower the Armington elasticity. 
 
Next, we consider the effects on global welfare.20 According to Proposition 2, introducing such a tax 
should also be beneficial from a global perspective. Figure 4 shows the global welfare cost of the 
different policies. We notice that OBR increases global welfare cost across alternative values for 
Armington elasticities, except in the case with homogenous goods. This is similar to findings in Figure 
                                                     
20 Global welfare accounting is based on a utilitarian (Benthamite) perspective on efficiency where welfare changes of 
individual regions are treated as perfect substitutes. 
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3 for region 1. Next, we see that introducing a consumption tax in addition to OBR reduces global 
welfare cost in all four cases, which is in accordance with Proposition 2. The lowest welfare cost is 
obtained when the consumption tax is in the range 80-100% of the OBR rate, i.e., close to the BCA-
equivalent rate. This holds irrespective of how close substitutes domestic and foreign goods are 
(including the homogenous goods case).  
 
Figure 4. Global welfare effects (HEV) under different policy scenarios and Armington 
elasticities (% change from BAU) 
 
 
Whereas the consumption tax is advantageous for region 1 and also for the two regions jointly, region 
2 is mostly worse off by the consumption tax. This is due to the disadvantageous terms-of-trade effects 
discussed above. 
 
Finally, we consider how the policies affect production output in the two regions. Output effects are 
shown in Figure 5 for the case with an Armington elasticity equal to 4. As expected, the emission price 
(REF) reduces output of the two carbon-intensive goods C_T and C_NT in region 1, and increases 
output of the good C_T in the other region 2. When OBR is introduced, the effects on output of the 
good C_T are turned around, as region 1 (2) marginally increases (decreases) its output compared to 
the BAU level (see the negative leakage rates in Figure 1). When the consumption tax is introduced on 
the good C_T in region 1, we observe that output of this good is reduced in both regions.  
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Figure 5. Production output in regions 1 and 2 under different policy scenarios (% change from 
BAU) 
 
 
We see from Figure 5 that also the C_NT output in region 1 increases notably when OBR is 
implemented for the good C_T, and then decreases when the consumption tax is implemented. The 
explanation behind is that the two emission-intensive goods are used quite a lot as intermediate inputs 
into each other’s production (relative to the NC_T good), see Table C2 in Appendix C. Thus, when the 
C_T production is stimulated by the OBR policy, this indirectly stimulates C_NT production, too (and 
vice versa with the consumption tax). Output of the carbon-free good NC_T in region 1 declines with 
the implementation of the emission price as well as with the introduction of OBR and the increase of 
the consumption tax from zero. This is partly due to reduced real income in region 1, and partly 
because production of this good uses the two carbon-intensive goods as inputs. 
4. Concluding remarks 
In the absence of world-wide cooperation to mitigate global warming, many countries consider or 
have introduced unilateral climate policies. This causes carbon leakage associated with the relocation 
of emission-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries. Economic theory and numerical studies 
suggest that border carbon adjustment, in addition to emission pricing, can be used as a second-best 
instrument to improve cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy. However, as carbon tariffs and 
export rebates are politically contentious to implement, policy makers have typically chosen other 
instruments such as variants of output-based rebating to EITE industries. 
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A prime example for output-based rebating is the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) where 
emission allowances are allocated to EITE industries conditional on output. Martin et al. (2014) find 
that there has been substantial overallocation of allowances in the EU ETS for the given carbon 
leakage risk. As the optimal allocation scheme relies on data that are not publicly observable, they 
propose a more “feasible” allocation scheme based on easily observable characteristics of firms such 
as employment and historic CO2 emissions.  
 
Our paper suggests an alternative strategy, namely to combine output-based rebating to production of 
EITE goods with a consumption tax on all use of the same EITE goods. We have shown analytically 
that it is welfare improving for a region to introduce such a consumption tax if output-based rebating 
is already in place. The theoretical result is confirmed when using a stylized numerical general 
equilibrium model calibrated to data for the world economy, highlighting that the welfare gains from 
such consumption taxes can be substantial. The administrative cost of adding such a consumption tax 
is likely to be moderate as the tax level could be set in proportion to the benchmarks already set by the 
emission allocation mechanisms in place. It is also important to realize that the addition of 
consumption taxes makes output-based rebating more robust with respect to uncertainties and political 
economy risks about leakage exposure: The distortive effects of allowance overallocation – by 
including too many sectors with limited carbon leakage risk or warranting too high rebates – are 
moderated.  
 
Regarding political feasibility of anti-leakage policies, we have shown that a certain combination of 
output-based rebating and a consumption tax is equivalent to full border carbon adjustment as long as 
the carbon tariffs (and the export rebate) are not differentiated across importers. Thus, whereas border 
carbon adjustment may be politically contentious to introduce under current WTO rules, the same 
outcome can in fact be achieved by supplementing output-based rebating with a consumption tax. 
 
We thus conclude that supplementing output-based rebating with a consumption tax constitutes smart 
hedging against carbon leakage: Compared to output-based rebating stand-alone it constitutes a robust 
strategy for improving cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy; compared to border carbon 
adjustment it limits the risks of potentially detrimental trade disputes. 
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Appendix A: Proofs and derivations 
Proof of Lemma 1:  
Differentiating welfare (5) with respect to the consumption tax we get: 
(11) 
             
     
1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
x y z
x y z x y z
y z y z
y z
e e
W x y z x y zu u u c c c
v v v v v v v
e e e ec c
v v v v
  
                       
                

  
 
By using the first-order conditions (2) and (3) we can simplify this equation: 
     
   
1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
x y y z
y z y z
W x x y y z zp p v p s p
v v v v v v v
e e e et t
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                               
              

 
 
In addition, from (4), we must have: 
(12)      1 1 11 1 11 11 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 ;y xy xp y y p x x z zy y p x x pv v v v v v v v                                  

 
 
We assume that the emission tax is set equal to the Pigouvian tax, i.e., 1 t . Using equation (12) we 
can then further simplify equation (11): 
         
    
1 11 1 1 2 21 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
y x y z
y y y
y z y x
W y y p p y y e ep y y x x p v p s
v v v v v v v v v
y y e y e z p pv s y y x x
v v y v z v v v


                                   
                        
 
 
where we also used the fact that emissions in region 2 are only affected via production changes of 
good y and z in region 2. For a given s1 (from the OBR regulation), we can solve for the optimal 1v by 
setting 1 1/ 0  W v . This gives equation (6). 
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Sign of first factor in equation (6): 
To see that the first factor of (6) is negative, note that equations (2) and (3) imply 1 1 1 1  yy yu c v s . 
Because the second order derivatives are non-zero and finite, an increase in 1v entails that 1yu  
increases and 1yyc  decreases when s1 is constant. This implies 
1 1/ 0  y v  and 1 1/ 0y v   , because 
1 0yyu  and 1 0yyc . 
 
Derivation of equation (9): 
We differentiate equation (8) and follow the steps explained in the proof of Lemma 1. This gives: 
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                

We also used 2 2 2 2 0y ze ec c t s    . Setting 1,/ 0 G GW v  gives equation (9). 
 
Proof of Corollary 3: 
We now extend the model to several heterogeneous EITE goods ym, with  1,2,...,m M . The ym-
goods produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes. The representative consumer’s utility 
from consumption in region j is given by        1 1 1 2 2 21 2 1 2, , ,..., , , ,..., ,j j j j j j j jj M Mu x y y y y y y z . We assume that 
the Hessian matrix associated with the consumers’ utility maximization problem is negative definite 
and that 1 2/ , , , 0j j j j
m m
j j j j j j
x y y z
u u x u u u    for all m M . The market equilibrium conditions and the 
first-order conditions w.r.t. goods x and z are not affected by the extension to several heterogeneous y 
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goods (i.e., they remain as in equations (1), (2), (3) and (10)). We therefore omit good x and z from the 
analysis below (except in budget constraints).  
 
Let ijmy  (
ij
my ) denote good ym produced in region j and sold (consumed) in region i. The market 
equilibrium condition for each ym good is:   
(13)   , 1,2 ,ijijm my y i j m M    , 
 
and we have 1 2j j jm m my y y  . We now show that the first-order conditions w.r.t. jmy  are equal across 
the regimes. The profit maximization problem for the producer of jmy  under OBR is: 
     1 2 1 21 2, ,emax (y ,e )m m m m my jj j mm m y j y j y j y j y jj j j j j jm m m m my y p s y p s y c t e       .  
 
for all m M . Here my ijp  refers to the price of good ym sold in region i and produced in region j. 
Further, jms , m
y je  and ( )my jc   refer to the output subsidy, emissions, and production costs related to ym, 
respectively.  
 
The associated first-order conditions imply: 
(14) 
11 21 11 1
12 22 2
1 21 ; 0
m m m
m m m
m m
y y y
m m y
y y y
y
y y
e e
p s p s c
p p c
c t c
   
 
  
 . 
 
for all m M . In the BCA case, competitive producers of y in region j maximize profits: 
       1 2 1 21 2, ,emax (y ,e ) , 1, 2 ,m m m m my jj j mm m y j y j y j y j y ji j j j j jm m m m my y p y p y c t e i j i j m M            . 
Here im  and jm  denote the carbon tariff and export rebate on good ym in region j, respectively. This 
gives the following first-order conditions for interior solution: 
(15) 
11 21 11
12 22 21
1 21 ; 0
m m m
m m m
m m
y y y
m y
y y y
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e e
p p c
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c t c


  
  
   
 . 
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for all m M . Finally, the representative consumer in region j maximizes welfare: 
        1 21 2max ( ) m mj j j jy j y jj xj j j zjm mm m
m M
u p x p v y p v y p z 

                . 
 
where       1 1 1 2 2 21 2 1 2, , ,..., , , ,..., ,
j j j j j j j j
M Mx y y y y y y z   . The associated first-order conditions for the y goods 
are: 
(16)  1,2 ,mji
m
y jij j
my
u p v i m M     ,  
 
which is valid under OBR and BCA ( 1 0v  under BCA).  
The budget constraint required for import expenditures to equal export revenue in region j is: 
(17)       0 , 1,2 ,m m ji jy ij y jiij x jm m
m M
p y p y p x x i j i j

        
 
under OBR and BCA.  
 
Following the steps in the derivation of equation (6), we find the optimal consumer tax with M 
heterogeneous y goods: 
    111 12 1 22 21 12 2 212 11*' 1 21 11 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1m m my y y z xm m m mm m m m
m Mm m m m m m m
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

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
 
The interpretation is similar to that of equation (6), with condition (7)  replaced with: 
 
22 2 2
2 1 2 1 0
my z
m
m M m m
ye e z
y v z v
            
 
The first part of Corollary 3 follows. 
 
We now turn to the second part of Corollary 3. Table A1 summarizes and compares the first-order 
conditions for the y goods: 
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Table A1. First-order conditions under the two regimes with M heterogeneous y goods.  
 OBR + tax BCA 
Production 1my
 11 21 11 1m m my y y
m m yp s p s c     11 21 11m m my y ym yp p c    
Production 2my
 12 22 2m m my y y
yp p c   12 22 21m m my y ym yp p c    
Abatement 1 21 ; 0m my ye ec t c    1 21 ; 0m my ye ec t c    
Consumption 11my  11 11 211 1m m
m
y y
m my
u p v p v     11 11 21 1m m
m
y y
my
u p p     
Consumption 12my   12 12 221 1m m
m
y y
m my
u p v p v     12 12 22 1m m
m
y y
my
u p p     
 
Note that equal consumption across regimes in region 1 implies equal consumption in region 2, given 
equal production levels and the market equilibrium condition (13). Table A1 shows that the first-order 
conditions are equal across the regimes if 1 1 1 1m m m mv s     . This proves the last part of Corollary 3. 
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Appendix B: Algebraic summary of the numerical CGE model  
Our stylized multi-sector multi-region computable general equilibrium model is formulated as a 
system of nonlinear inequalities. The inequalities correspond to the two classes of conditions 
associated with a general equilibrium: (i) exhaustion of product (zero profit) conditions for producers 
with constant returns to scale; and (ii) market clearance for all goods and factors. The former class 
determines activity levels, and the latter determines price levels. In equilibrium, each variable is linked 
to one inequality condition: an activity level to an exhaustion of product constraint and a commodity 
price to a market clearance condition. In our algebraic exposition, the notation is Π zgr  used to denote 
the unit profit function (calculated as the difference between unit revenue and unit cost) for production 
with constant returns to scale of sector g in region r, where z is the name assigned to the associated 
production activity. Differentiating the unit profit function with respect to input and output prices 
provides compensated demand and supply coefficients (Hotelling’s lemma), which appear 
subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We use g as an index for all sectors/commodities 
except primary fossil energy and index r (aliased with s) to denote region. Furthermore, we indicate 
complementarity between equilibrium conditions and variables with the operator . 
 
Tables B1–B6 explain the notations for variables and parameters employed within our algebraic 
exposition. Figures B1-B3 sketch the nesting of functional forms in production and consumption 
together with the default elasticities underlying our central case simulations. Numerically, the model is 
implemented in GAMS (Brooke et al., 1996)21 and solved using PATH (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995).22 
 
Table B.1. Indices and sets 
G Set of all commodities {NC_T, C_T, C_NT, FE} 
EG Subset of primary energy goods {FE} 
R  Set of regions {1, 2} 
g (alias i) Index for sectors and commodities  
r (alias s) Index for regions 
 
  
                                                     
21 Brooke, A., D. Kendrick, and Meeraus, A. (1996). GAMS: A User’s Guide. GAMS Development Corporation: 
Washington DC. 
22 Dirkse, S., and M. Ferris (1995). The PATH Solver: A Non-monotone Stabilization Scheme for Mixed Complementarity 
Problems. Optimization Methods & Software 5: 123–56. 
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Table B.2. Activity variables 
grY  Production of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
grM  Material composite for commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
grKL  Value-added composite for commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
grA  Armington aggregate of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
grIM  Import aggregate of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
rC  Consumption composite in region ݎ 
 
Table B.3. Price variables 
grp  Price of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
M
grp  Price of material composite for commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
KL
grp  Price of value-added composite for commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
A
grp  Price of Armington aggregate of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
IM
grp  Price of aggregate imports of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
C
rp   Price of consumption composite in region ݎ 
rw  Price of labor (wage rate) in region ݎ 
rv  Price of capital services (rental rate) in region ݎ 
rq  Rent for primary energy resource in region ݎ 
2CO
rp  Price of carbon emissions in region ݎ 
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Table B.4. Cost shares 
M
gr  Cost share of material composite in production of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
FE
gr  Cost share of primary energy in capital-labor-energy composite input to production of 
commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
MN
igr  Cost share of input ݅ in material composite of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
K
gr   Cost share of capital within the value-added of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
Q
r   Cost share of primary energy resource in primary energy production in region ݎ 
,
LN
FE r   Cost share of labor in non-resource composite of primary energy production in region ݎ 
,
KN
FE r  Cost share of capital in non-resource input to primary energy production in region ݎ 
, ,
N
g FE r   Cost share of good ݃ in non-resource input to primary energy production in region ݎ 
A
gr   Cost share of domestic input ݃ in the Armington composite of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
IM
gsr  Cost share of commodity	݃ from region ݏ in import composite of region ݎ 
C
gr  Cost share of commodity ݃ in consumption composite of region ݎ 
 
Table B.5. Elasticities of substitution 
KLEM
gr  Substitution between the material composite and the energy-value-added aggregate in 
production of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
KLE
gr  Substitution between primary fossil energy and the value-added nest in production of 
commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
M
gr  Substitution between material inputs within the material composite in production of 
commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
KL
gr  Substitution between the capital and labor within the value-added composite in 
production of commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
Q
gr  Substitution between natural resource input and the composite of other inputs in primary 
energy production in region ݎ 
A
gr  Substitution between import composite and domestic input to Armington production of 
commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
IM
gr  Substitution between imports from different regions within the import composite of 
commodity ݃ in region ݎ 
C
r  Substitution between commodity inputs to composite consumption in region ݎ 
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Table B.6. Endowments 
rL  Aggregate labor endowment in region ݎ  
rK  Capital endowment in region ݎ  
rQ  
Resource endowment of primary fossil energy in region ݎ  
2rCO  Endowment with CO2 emission allowances in region ݎ 
2
,
CO
FE ra  CO2 emissions coefficient for primary fossil energy in region ݎ 
Zero profit conditions 
 Production of goods except fossil primary energy ( g EG ): 
      
   
 
   
2 2
11
, ,
1
1 1
1 1
Π  1
1 0
KLEKLEM
grgr
KLEM KLEM
gr gr
KLE KLE
gr gr
CO COy M M M FE
gr gr gr gr gr gr FE r FE r r
FE KL
gr gr gr
p p p a p
p Y

 
 
  


 
 
      
  

  
 
 
 Sector-specific material composite ( g EG ): 
   
1
11Π 0
MM grgrM M MN A
gr gr igr ir gr
i EG
p p M
 

        
 
 Sector-specific value-added aggregate ( g EG ): 
       11 1 1Π 1 0KL KL KLgr gr grKL KL K Kgr gr gr r gr r grp v w KL               
 
 Production of primary fossil fuel: 
       
1
1 1
1
, , , , , , ,Π 1    0
Q Q
r r
Q
rY Q Q LN KN N A
FE r FE r r r r FE r r FE r r g FE r gr FE r
g EG
p q w v p Y
 
    
 


              
  
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 Armington aggregate ( g EG ): 
       11 1 1Π 1 0A A Agr gr grA A A A IMgr gr gr gr gr gr grp p p A               
 
 Import composite ( g EG ): 
   
1
11Π 0
IMIM
grgrIM IM IM
gr gr gsr gs gr
s r
p p IM
 

        
 
 Consumption composite: 
   
1
11Π 0
CC grgrC C C A
r r gr gr r
g EG
p p C
 

        
 
Market clearance conditions 
 Labor: 
,
,
ΠΠ
 
KLY
grFE r
r FE r gr r
g EGr r
L Y KL w
w w
     
 
 Capital: 
,
,
ΠΠ
 
KLY
grFE r
r FE r gr r
g EGr r
K Y KL v
v v
     
 
 Primary fossil energy resource:  
,
,
Π
 
Y
FE rY
r FE r r
r
Q Y q
q
   
 
 Material composite ( g EG ): 
ΠYgr M
gr gr grM
gr
M Y p
p
   
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 Value-added ( g EG ): 
ΠYgr KL
gr gr grKL
gr
KL Y p
p
   
 
 Armington aggregate ( g EG ): 
,
,
Π ΠΠ  
Y MC
FE r Airr
gr r FE r ir grA A A
i EGgr gr gr
A C Y M p
p p p
        
 
 Import composite ( g EG ): 
ΠAgr IM
gr gr grIM
gr
IM A p
p
   
 
 Goods except primary energy ( g EG ): 
Π Π
  
A IM
gr gs
gr gr gs gr
s rgr gs
Y A IM p
p p
      
 
 Primary energy: 
 2 2, ,, ,
ΠYgr
FE r gr FE rCO CO
g EG FE r FE r r
Y Y p
p a p
    
 
 Private consumption (g = C): 
2 2COC Crr r r r r r r r r rp C wL v K q Q p CO p      
 
 Carbon emissions: 
2 2
, ,2
CO CO
r FE r FE r rCO a Y p   
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Figure B1. Nesting in non-energy production 
 
Elasticities: σKLE_M = 0.25; σKLE = 0.5; σM = 0; σKL = 1 
 
Figure B2. Nesting in energy production 
Elasticities: σR =0.9; σNR=0 
 
Figure B3. Nesting in final consumption  
Elasticities: σC =0.5 
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Appendix C: Mapping of GTAP sectors and base-year data 
Table C1 shows the mapping of the 57 GTAP sectors to the four composite sectors in our model. 
Table C1. Mapping of GTAP sectors to composite model sectors 
Model sectors GTAP sectors 
FE: fossil energy composite Coal; Crude oil; Gas (extraction and distribution) 
C_T: carbon-intensive and tradable goods Refined oil; Ferrous metals; Non-ferrous metals; 
Non-metallic minerals; Chemical rubber products; 
Other machinery and equipment; Paper and paper 
products 
C_NT: carbon-intensive and non-tradable goods Electricity; All transport sectors (air, water, rail, road) 
NC_T: carbon-free and tradable goods All remaining goods and services 
 
Table C2 shows the derived SAM for each region. The entries constitute value flows with negative 
values being inputs (demands) and positive values being output or endowments (supplies). Since the 
base-year data is given in value terms, we have to choose units for goods and factors to separate price 
and quantity observations. A commonly used convenient convention is to choose units for both goods 
and factors to have a price of unity in the base-year such that values readily transfer into quantities.23 
In general, data consistency of a social accounting matrix requires that the sums of each of the rows 
and columns equal zero. Whereas market equilibrium conditions (including trade balance) are 
associated with the rows, the columns capture the zero-profit condition for production sectors as well 
as the income balance for the aggregate household sector. 
Table C2. Base-year data for stylized model simulations. Social accounting matrix (in bn USD) 
for each region based on GTAP9 data* 
 C_T C_NT NC_T FE X M FD C 
C_T 4521 -659.5 -3281 -40.5 -565 565 -540  
C_NT -486 3136.5 -1495.5 -51   -1104  
NC_T -1189 -816.5 26189 -221 -1440 1440 -23962.5  
FE -994.5 -203.5  1198     
LAB -957 -733.5 -13001.5 -127    14819 
CAP -894.5 -723.5 -8411 -462    10491 
RES    -296.5    296.5 
INC_EXP       25606.5 -25606.5 
BOP     2005 -2005   
* C_T denotes carbon-intensive and tradable goods, C_NT carbon-intensive and non-tradable goods, NC_T carbon-free and 
tradable goods, FE fossil energy composite, X exports, M imports, FD final demand, C consumption, LAB labor, CAP capital, 
RES energy resource, INC-EXP income-expenditure constraint, BOP balance-of-payment constraint 
                                                     
23 We abstract from explicit tax wedges and use gross-of-tax values throughout to suppress initial tax distortions which are 
also absent in our theoretical analysis.  
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